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WHERE TO FROM HERE FOR THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH: RECOMMENDATIONS 94 AND 95 OF THE
REDRESS AND CIVIL LITIGATION REPORT
Jane Power *
I Introduction
The Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (the
Royal Commission) was called by then Prime Minister the Hon. Julia Gillard,
MP, on 12 November 2012.1 The breadth of the abuse in society’s institutions was
disturbingly wide:
The sexual abuse of children has occurred in almost every type of institu-
tion where children reside or attend for educational, recreational, sporting,
religious or cultural activities. Some institutions have had multiple abusers
who sexually abused multiple children. It is not a case of a few ‘rotten
apples’. Society’s major institutions have seriously failed.2
The Recommendations made by the Commission both in its Final Report submit-
ted on 15 December 20173 and the final recommendations in its interim Redress
and Civil Litigation Report published in 2015,4relate to all institutions against
*Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Notre Dame Australia
1Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse,
Redress and Civil Litigation Report (2015).
2Ibid 5.
3Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse,
Final Report (2017).
4McClellan AM, above n 1, Although the report was an interim one the Commission made
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whom allegations of abuse were made.5 This paper only considers two recommend-
ations, namely Recommendations 94 and 95 that relate to the legal structure of
the Church in Australia and only in relation to law reform for the Catholic Church
(the Church). Recommendations 94 and 95 in the Redress and Civil Litigation
Report arose as a consequence of survivors of child sexual abuse being unable to
either properly identify a relevant legal entity to sue, or being unsuccessful on
legal technicalities when they did commence an action. These issues do not just
arise for plaintiffs wishing to commence legal action for compensation relating to
child sexual abuse. They affected all would be plaintiffs wishing to commence
any legal action against the Church in Australia except those relating to property.
Recommendation 16.7 of the Final Report states:
The Australian Catholic Bishops Conference should conduct a national re-
view of the governance and management structures of dioceses and parishes,
including in relation to issues of transparency, accountability, consultation
and the participation of lay men and women. This review should draw from
the approaches to governance of Catholic health, community services and
education agencies.
Therefore, in discussing the efficacy of Recommendations 94 and 95, this paper
examines the current legal status and structure of the Church to determine those
‘governance and management structures’.
II Recommendation 94
Recommendation 94 addresses the need for a victim of institutional child sexual
abuse to be able to sue a legally recognised body for damages relating to the abuse,
the recommendations within it final recommendations.
5The percentage of survivors reporting abuse in religious institutions to the Royal Commission
were: Catholic - 61.4; Anglican - 14.8; Salvation Army - 7.2; Protestant - 4.4; Presbyterian and
Reformed - 2.8; Uniting Church - 2.3; Other Christian - 1.9; Jehovah’s Witness - 1.8; Baptist -
1.2; Pentecostal - 1.0; Judaism - 0.6; other religious organisations - 3.9: Commonwealth, Royal
Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Final Information Update (2017)
1.
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even if that body only relates to issues concerning property. Recommendation 94
states:
94. State and territory governments should introduce legislation to provide
that, where a survivor wishes to commence proceedings for damages in
respect of institutional child sexual abuse where the institution is alleged to
be an institution with which a property trust is associated, then unless the
institution nominates a proper defendant to sue that has sufficient assets to
meet any liability arising from the proceedings:
a. the property trust is a proper defendant to the litigation
b. any liability of the institution with which the property trust is associ-
ated that arises from the proceedings can be met from the assets of
the trust.
III The Legal Structure of the Catholic Church
Recommendation 94 invites the question ‘is the alleged perpetrator not the most
relevant party to sue’? Suing the alleged perpetrator is unhelpful as s/he are
unlikely to have any financial means to satisfy any court order for damages, as
they have usually taken a vow of poverty or are bound to pass their property
to ownership by the Church. If the Church holds the property then why is the
Church not the most suitable party for a litigant to sue? The simple answer is
that the Church has no legal identity within Australian law and therefore cannot
be sued directly. Why then not sue the local bishop as representative of the
Church? Pursuing an action against the Church in vicarious liability is fraught
with difficulties, not least of which is its lack of legal capacity.6
6The difficulties of suing the Church or the Archbishop in vicarious liability are discussed in
McClellan AM, above n 1, 464.
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A What is the Church if it has no legal structure?
‘In the Christian context, “the church” means a grouping of people who have a
common religious belief, founded on the person of Jesus Christ. The Church then is
not so much a physical “thing” as it is a community of “people”’.7 The ‘Church’ in
canon law has no separate juridical personality, or identity as a ‘being’; therefore,
in canonical terms the Church is not an entity. The juridical entity of the diocese or
parish has direct relevance to canonical issues, but not common law issues. When
discussing legal issues8 the diocese or parish is the object of such discussion. In
common law the Church is also not an entity; it is an unincorporated association,
as are the diocese and parish:
[w]ithin the Catholic Church in WA9 there is one archdiocese10 in Perth
and three dioceses in Bunbury, Broome and Geraldton, each with an arch-
bishop11 or bishop12 at its governance head. The dioceses of Perth, Bun-
bury, Geraldton and Broome together constitute the ecclesiastical province
of Perth. The Archbishop of Perth is the Metropolitan of the Province.13
‘The spirit of the law is to minimise the involvement of the metropolitan in
the affairs of the suffragan dioceses’.14
The dioceses are part of the Church hierarchy; the dioceses represent the Church.
In Western Australia (WA) each diocesan bishop is a separate statutory corpora-
tion sole in relation to property and each has exclusive governance of his diocese.
7Brian Lucas, Peter Slack and William d’Apice, Church Administration Handbook (St Pauls,
2008) 24. Juridical persons are ‘an aggregate of persons or things’ (canon 113 §2) and in canon
law are ‘subjects of obligations and rights which accord with their nature’ (canon 113 §1). Canon
1254 refers specifically to the Universal Church as being able to acquire property but in the local
Australian context, the ‘Church’ does not have juridical personality. The Australian Catholic
Bishops’ Conference, dioceses and parishes do have separate juridical personalities.
8This paper only considers the common law issues, not canon law issues, relevant to Recom-
mendations 94 and 95.
9Dioceses are often created to coincide with geographical boundaries to easily interact with
the civil government of the region: Lucas, Slack and d’Apice, above n 8, 130.
10Code of Canon Law 1983 canon 431.
11Code of Canon Law 1983 canon 435 and 436.
12Ibid canons 481, 391 and 393.
13Ibid canons 431 and 432. The powers of the position are set out in canon 436.
14Lucas, Slack and d’Apice, above n 8, 133.
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All four positions of the Bishops are ‘equal’. ‘Within the diocese the bishop has
the responsibility for teaching and pastoral government’.15 The dioceses16 are
separate juridical persons (canonical entities) and the diocesan bishops are the
representative of the dioceses17 and may be the relevant legal entity in any legal
proceeding, but in their personal capacity not their office,18 and they will rarely if
ever hold any property in their personal capacity. The common law status of the
diocesan bishops in non-property matters is uncertain. They could be:
• a corporation sole at common law—this seems unlikely in light of Archbishop
of Perth v AA to JC Inclusive (1995) 18 ACSR 333 (the Archbishop of
Perth case), which leaves open the possibility that the Church could be a
corporation sole at common law, but dicta in the case suggests it is unlikely
a court would decide this;
• personally liable —as in Barry James Hickey Archbishop of Perth v Inde-
pendent Schools Salaried Officers Association [2003] WAIR Com 10127 in
which the archbishop was recognised as the employer; or
• an agent for an unincorporated association, that is, the bishops representing
the Church as the heads of the dioceses.
Confusion in legal proceedings arises as the alleged perpetrator and the local bishop
are unlikely to have the personal capacity to fulfil any award of damages. The
15Ibid 39.
16The diocese is defined in canon 369, it can only be created by the Pope and obtains juridical
personality by law (canon 373). It is, by virtue of canon 372 §1, usually a defined territory and
that is the case in WA. A diocese is divided into parishes (canon 374 §1), which are separate
canonical entities (canon 515 §3) although in common law are recognised as an unincorporated
association with no common law identity.
17See also, Vatican Council II, Lumen Gentium (21 November 1964), [21-23] <http://www.
vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat- ii_const_19641121_
lumen-gentium_en.html>.
18This is because the office does not have any separate common law identity other than as an
unincorporated association. The diocese and parish have a clearly identifiable canon law identity
as juridical persons.
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Church has no common law status as an unincorporated association, which is not
recognised as a legal entity with rights and obligations. Determining the correct
parties to proceedings involving the Catholic Church is a difficult and frustrating
concept and led to the Royal Commission making Recommendation 94.19
IV Legal Structures in the Dioceses
Although the Church has no legal identity, it needs some form of legal structure
to hold its property interests; the only legal entities relating to the Church are in
relation to property. In most states the dioceses are the focus of legal status but
that status varies between the states. In WA the diocesan bishops as statutory cor-
porations sole separately hold the property of all four Roman Catholic dioceses. In
other states, the Catholic Church adopted other legal entities, including property
trusts.
A Statutory Property Trusts
In NSW, the Trustees for the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of
Sydney (‘Sydney Trustees’), a statutory body corporate with perpetual succes-
sion, was established under the Roman Catholic Church Trust Property Act 1936
(NSW) (the NSW Act).20 In Victoria, the Roman Catholic Trusts Corporation in-
19See McClellan AM, above n 1, 509-511; Trustees for the Roman Catholic Church for the
Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis [2007] NSWCA 117; Truth Justice and Healing Council, Submission
No 21 to Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Commonwealth,
Issues Paper No 5 Civil Litigation.
20Broadly, a trust is ‘a device by which one person holds property for the benefit of another
person. A trust imposes a personal equitable obligation upon a person (‘trustee’) to deal with
property for the benefit of another person or class of persons (‘beneficiary’) or for the advance-
ment of certain purposes, private or charitable’: Peter Butt (ed), Butterworths Concise Australian
Legal Dictionary (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2004) 433-3. See below for a discussion of
the Ellis case in which Mr Ellis instigated proceedings against the Sydney Trustees.
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corporated pursuant to the Roman Catholic Trusts Act 1907 (Vic) (the Victorian
Act). The relevant statutes in NSW and Victoria restrict the purpose of the rel-
evant body to proprietary interests and rights. Under the NSW Act s 9 ‘[a] body
corporate created by this Act has all the powers of a natural person, including
(without limiting the scope of those powers) the power...’ that relates to allowing
it to purchase, lease, sell, bequest, mortgage and otherwise deal with the property.
Likewise, the preamble to the Victorian Act states the purpose of it as being solely
concerned with property:
WHEREAS the property of the Roman Catholic Church in Victoria is held
by many different bodies of trustees: AND WHEREAS owing to death and
other causes the necessity for the appointment of new trustees is continually
arising: AND WHEREAS it is expedient that corporate bodies of trustees
should be created for the purpose of holding managing and dealing with the
property of the said Church and that for the better management thereof
certain properties of the said Church should be vested in such corporate
bodies and that the conveyance and transfer of such properties should be
facilitated and rendered less expensive...
Section 3 of the Victorian Act then permits the corporate body that is the prop-
erty trust to hold manage and deal with property, including leasing, charging,
mortgaging, and otherwise encumbering a title of property.21 The property trust
is a separate legal entity to the Church. The relevant statutes limit trust status to
legal issues relating to property only. In all other matters, unrelated to property,
common law recognises that the Roman Catholic Church, including its dioceses
and parishes, is an unincorporated association.22 A plaintiff seeking compensation
for child sexual abuse cannot sue the property trust as the cause of action does
not relate to the property.23 Any litigant seeking compensation from the Church
for a cause of action in anything other than property, has no defendant to sue.
21Roman Catholic Trusts Act 1907 (Vic) s 15.
22Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney [2005] NSWSC 381.
23Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis (2007) 70
NSWLR 565.
7
(2018) 20 UNDALR
B The Corporation Sole
Recommendation 94 only refers to ‘property trusts’. In WA the legal entity used
to manage Catholic Church property is the corporation sole. It is unlikely that
the Royal Commission intended to exclude WA from this recommendation, but to
encompass all legal entities used to hold the Catholic Church’s property.
A corporation is an artificial person in law.24 Corporations developed through
common law for centuries, with Sir William Blackstone describing the need for
them:
As all personal rights die with the person; and as the necessary forms of
investing a series of individuals, one after another, with the same individual
rights, would be very inconvenient if not impracticable; it has been found
necessary, when it is for the advantage of the public to have any particular
rights kept on foot and continued, to constitute artificial persons, who may
maintain a perpetual succession, and enjoy a kind of legal immortality.
These artificial persons are called bodies politic, bodies corporate (corpora
corporate) or corporations.25
In WA the Catholic Church holds its property through the historical, and relatively
unused, corporation sole. Corporations sole are created by statute or recognised
in common law. It is a body corporate but has no members or shareholders. It
consists of an individual who holds a particular office (eg a bishop) and each holder
of that office constitutes the corporation sole whilst ever in that office’:26
The corporation sole consists therefore of only one person and that person’s
successors to a particular position, where that person constitutes an artificial
legal person in which title to property could be vested ... A corporation sole
is meant to give those individuals who hold an office or station some legal
capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which they could
not have in their capacity as natural persons.27
The corporation sole therefore has a separate legal identity to the person who holds
24Butt (ed), above n 20, 98.
25Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (, 1765) vol 1, 455.
26Lucas, above n 7, 240.
27Butt (ed), above n 20 98.
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the office or title. The bishop holds the property as the office of the corporation
sole, not in his personal capacity. The corporation sole does not require the formal
transfer of the powers, duties and ownership of property that is normally required
when a person leaves an office or dies.28
The corporation sole is an historical entity created to accommodate situations
where the main office holder of the corporation was an ‘office’ rather than an
individual; it is ‘the incorporation of an office’,29 its origins in ecclesiastical law.
Historically, the corporation sole was particularly useful for ecclesiastical bodies
where the bishop held the office, usually until their death. Before the corporation
sole, the church had to transfer the ownership of diocesan temporal goods into the
name of the person succeeding the deceased officeholder, an expensive and time-
consuming procedure which often left the church unable to deal with their property
for a considerable time until the transfers were completed.30 The corporation sole
was adopted as the common way to incorporate church bodies in several common
law countries.31
A corporation sole may be statutory – created by a specific statute, or a common
law corporation sole – arising from common law without statutory recognition.
From the 17th century in England, the Church of England was the established
church, with the monarch as the Head of the Church. On the colonisation of
Australia, ecclesiastical law was not received with other common law as there was
no established church as in England. Consequently, the common law corporation
28Crouch v Commissioner for Railways (Qld) (1985) 159 CLR 22.
29James B O’Hara, ‘The Modern Corporation Sole’ (1988-1989) 93 Dickinson Law Review 23,
25.
30Although it was initially a legal entity adopted and developed to accommodate property
transfer within the church, in the 17th century the Crown was also recognised as a corpora-
tion sole: R.P Austin and I.M Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 15th ed, 2013) 35.
31Including England, the United States of America and parts of Australia. The first American
provision for a corporation sole was in Maryland in 1833 Francis J Weber, ‘Corporation Sole in
California’ (1965) The Jurist 330.
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sole is not the legal entity of any church in Australia, though several cases argued
that in recent years.32 Only statutory corporations sole are currently recognised
in Australia.33 Commentators have suggested that the corporation sole is not a
corporation at all but an anomaly.34 Admittedly, it is not a corporation pursuant
to s 57A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), nonetheless, the corporation sole has
the main features of a corporation:
• it has perpetual succession;
• it can hold property;
• it can sue and be sued; and
• both the property and the powers of the corporation sole are transferable on
the death of the office holder to their successors in the particular office (not
to their heirs, executors or administrators),
but there is no board of directors or shareholders—only the present, serving office
holder.35
32Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis (2007) 70
NSWLR 565; Archbishop of Perth v AA (1995) 18 ACSR 333; Hubbard Association of Scientolo-
gists International v Attorney General for the State of Victoria [1976] VR 119; For a discussion on
whether the Church of England was ever the ‘established’ church of Australia see Renae Barker,
The Changing Relationship Between the State and Religion in Australia: 1788 to Modern Aus-
tralia. What has Changed? What is the Same? And what does that Tell Us? (PhD Thesis,
UWA, 2014) 31.
33For example (in addition to the corporations sole of the Catholic bishops in WA) the Public
Trustee in Queensland and NSW are statutory corporations sole: s 8 Public Trustee Act 1978
(Qld) s 8 and Public Trustee Act 1913 (NSW) s 7.
34See Robert L Raymond, ‘The Genesis of the Corporation’ (1905-1906) Harvard Law Review
350, 361.
35O’Hara, above n 29, 25-6; Austin, above n 30 35.
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C The Corporation Sole in WA
The bishop’s’ offices in WA are statutory corporations sole acting independently
of each other. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Perth was originally established as a
statutory corporation sole.36 Subsequently, the term ‘archbishop’ was substituted
for ‘bishop’ in 1916.37 The bishops of Geraldton, Bunbury and Broome are also
individual statutory corporations sole38 which hold any diocesan property in their
name. Section 4 of the Roman Catholic Church Property Acts Amendment Act
1916 (WA), specifically states the powers of the archbishop in relation to selling,
leasing and mortgaging church property.39 Those powers include the ability to
purchase, sell, exchange, lease or ‘dispose of [property] in any other manner’. The
bishop may ‘mortgage whether legally or equitably’ (including equitable charges),40
enter into a guarantee441 or partnership,42 or become a member of a company.43 He
may ‘compound, release or settle claims by or against him in his corporate name,
whether in contract or tort...’.44 Section 4(2)(g) of the Roman Catholic Church
36Roman Catholic Church Property Act 1911 (WA) s 4(1).
37Roman Catholic Church Property Acts Amendment Act 1916 (WA) s 3; The corporation sole
is known as ‘The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Perth’. Due to the growth of the Diocese of
Perth, it became an Archdiocese hence the need for the change in the name of the corporation
sole.
38Roman Catholic Geraldton Church Property Act 1925 (WA) s 4; the corporation sole is known
as ‘The Roman Catholic Bishop of Geraldton’. Roman Catholic Bunbury Church Property Act
1955 (WA) s 4; the corporation sole is known as ‘The Roman Catholic Bishop of Bunbury’.
Roman Catholic Vicariate of the Kimberleys Property Act 1957 (WA) s 4; the name of the Act
changed pursuant to section 9 of the; Roman Catholic Vicariate of the Kimberleys Property Act
Amendment Act 1970 (WA); The corporation sole is known as ‘The Roman Catholic Bishop of
Broome’. The Abbot of New Norcia (a Benedictine Monk Community) was also a corporation
sole and known as ‘The Abbot Nullius of New Norcia’ pursuant to s 4 of the Roman Catholic
New Norcia Church Property Act 1929 (WA); ‘The Abbey Nullius of New Norcia was suppressed
and incorporated within the Archdiocese of Perth on 12 March 1982’ Lucas, above n 7, 267.
39The other relevant statutes referred to above provide identical or very similar powers.
40Roman Catholic Church Property Acts Amendment Act 1916 (WA) s 4(2)(c).
41Ibid s 4(2)(d).
42Ibid s 4(2)(e).
43Ibid s 4(2)(f).
44Ibid s 4(2)(g). However, s 4(4) restricts these powers so that they do not apply to ‘lands
which have been granted by the Crown to or for the use of the Roman Catholic Church and
which are vested in the Archbishop, except with the prior approval of the Governor’.
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Property Acts Amendment Act 1916 (WA) allows a bishop to ‘...compound, release
or settle claims by or against him in his corporate name, whether in contract or
tort,...’ but it does not confer a statutory ability to sue the bishop in tort for
matters unrelated to property. This was affirmed in the Archbishop of Perth case:
That statute created such a body corporate only for the limited purposes
provided by the statute, they being purposes related to the holding of and
dealing with property and matters associated therewith, and do not permit
or contemplate the body corporate being responsible for an action in tort
unrelated to property.45
Contractual and tortious claims are limited to actions relating to the property.
These statutory corporations sole cannot be sued for actions other than those
relating to the property of the Church. In all other matters, unrelated to property,
common law recognises that the Roman Catholic Church, including its individual
dioceses and parishes, is an unincorporated association46 and not a corporation
sole.47 A Plaintiff seeking compensation for child sexual abuse cannot sue the
corporation sole as the cause of action does not relate to the property. Any litigant
seeking compensation from the church for a cause of action in anything other than
property, had no defendant to sue, hence the need for Recommendation 94.
V Recommendation 95
Recommendation 95 addresses a need for victims to have access to financial com-
pensation from unincorporated associations, through insurance, and connects the
Governments’ financial support of these institutions to the insurance requirement.
Although not specifically stated, the implication is that funding is dependent on
45Archbishop of Perth v AA (1995) 18 ACSR 333, per Cole JA at 348 referring to the 1911
Act, Kirby, J at 336 and Meagher, JA at 341.
46Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney [2005] NSWSC 381.
47Archbishop of Perth v AA (1995) 18 ACSR 333, The office of the diocesan bishops in canon
law is the representative of the juridical person that is the diocese. Canonically, the dioceses
constitute separate public juridical persons, ie separate entities in canon law.
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institutions having the insurance:
95. The Australian Government and state and territory governments should
consider whether there are any unincorporated bodies that they fund dir-
ectly or indirectly to provide children’s services. If there are, they should
consider requiring them to maintain insurance that covers their liability in
respect of institutional child sexual abuse claims.
A The Church as an Unincorporated Association
The unincorporated association is a business structure typically found in not-for-
profit organisations, social and sporting clubs, and voluntary associations.48 Dio-
ceses and parishes in Australia are unincorporated associations.49Trust2005 Trust-
ees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis (2007) 70
NSWLR 565 (‘Ellis’)50 recognised parishes as unincorporated associations and the
parties, and judges, acknowledged that the Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney was an
unincorporated association (and therefore dioceses in general). The unincorpor-
ated association has long been a problematic legal concept due to its lack of legal
status, though its definition has been relatively clear for some time.51 There are
no statutory requirements relating to the formation or administration of an unin-
corporated body; it is only governed by case law. Cameron v Hogan, the leading
Australian case on unincorporated associations, defines them as follows:
They are for the most part bodies of persons who have combined to further
some common end or interest, which is social, sporting, political, scientific,
religious, artistic or humanitarian in character, or otherwise stands apart
from private gain and material advantage. Such associations are established
48Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358, 370-371 (Rich, Dixon, Evatt, and McTiernan JJ)..
49The Church has no common law identity nor is it a public juridical person. Dioceses however,
are separate public juridical persons (with the diocesan bishops as the representative of their
respective dioceses) and are unincorporated associations in common law: Trustees of the Roman
Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565.
50Commonwealth, Case Study 08: Mr John Ellis, Towards Healing and Civil litigation 10 –26
March 2014 <https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/case-studies/case-study-08-mr-
john-ellis-towards-healing-and-civil-litigation>.
51Many of the cases considering unincorporated associations demonstrate their problematic
nature arising from the lack of legal status.
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upon a consensual basis, but, unless there were some clear positive indica-
tion that the members contemplated the creation of legal relations inter se,
the rules adopted for their governance would not be treated as amounting
to an enforceable contract.52
This very wide common law definition contains no provision for any formal re-
quirements relating to the establishment of an unincorporated association. Nor is
there provision for its administration, such as a constitution, contractual liability
between members, property ownership or management of the unincorporated asso-
ciation.53 The only common factor appears to be the not-for-profit status of these
bodies. Establishing an unincorporated association is, therefore, very simple: a
group of people (members) with a common not-for-profit interest voluntarily es-
tablish a group and name it. They may or may not draft and adopt rules or a
constitution, they will generally choose a committee from the members, but are
not required to, and they may or may not own property held on trust. Today the
Cameron v Hogan definition remains the current law and it is accepted that
[v]oluntary non-profit associations are associations, clubs, societies or other
groups of persons that are formed or carried on for any lawful purpose
which does not result in the association’s members making any profit from
its activities or dividing its property among themselves while the association
remains in existence.54
Characteristics of the unincorporated association include that it:55
• is formed for a common purpose;
• is a not-for-profit group;
52Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358, 370-371 (Rich, Dixon, Evatt, and McTiernan JJ)..
53Myles McGregor-Lowndes and Frances Hannah, ‘Unincorporated Associations as Entities:
A Matter of Balance between Regulation and Facilitation?’ (2010) 28 Company and Securities
Law Journal 197, 205.
54A.S Sievers, Associations and Club Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd
ed, 2010) 1.
55These are common characteristics identified from relevant cases and commentary. See gen-
erally Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358; Trustees for the Roman Catholic Church for the
Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis [2007] NSWCA 117; Sievers, above n 54.
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• is not regulated by statute and is therefore subject to common law principles;
• does not necessarily have a fixed or finite membership;56
• may or may not hold property (but only pursuant to a trust or other relevant
legal entity);
• cannot sue or be sued; and
• may or may not have rules or a constitution (though it is now rare that they
do not).
It is arguable that the dioceses are unincorporated associations without any writ-
ten rules57 and a large membership that is difficult to determine at any point in
time. The unincorporated association’s lack of legal status causes problems for its
members and those dealing with it, including the relationship between its mem-
bers, the ability to sue and be sued, to enter into contracts, to be held liable for
tortious acts, and to own and insure property.
1 Identity in Legal Proceedings
As the unincorporated association is not a legal entity it follows that it cannot sue
or be sued, and therefore has no legal standing to commence, or join other parties
to, court actions. This raises various issues and difficulties in relation to legal
rights and liabilities in both contract and tort, as experienced by many victims of
institutional child sexual abuse.58
56Trustees for the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis [2007] NSWCA
117, 576 [47](Mason P with whom Ipp and McColl JJA concurred).
57Although not tested, it is unlikely that canon law would be accepted as the unincorporated
association’s ‘Rules’.
58The victims of institutional child sexual abuse need to be able to sue in tort.
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2 Who to Sue?
Ellis demonstrates the difficulty of identifying the correct parties to join in legal
proceedings involving an unincorporated association. The plaintiff originally com-
menced proceedings59 in relation to alleged sexual abuse perpetrated by a Catholic
priest in the 1970s. In addition to the priest, the plaintiff eventually sued His Em-
inence George Cardinal Pell Archbishop of Sydney for and on behalf of the Roman
Catholic Church in the archdiocese of Sydney; and the Sydney Trustees.
It was never the plaintiff’s contention that Cardinal Pell was personally responsible;
Cardinal Pell was not a Cardinal60 nor even in the relevant diocese at the time of
the alleged offences. The plaintiff joined him in the proceedings as representing
the Church at the time of commencing the action. The NSW Act allowed for the
establishment of the Sydney Trustees (a statutory corporation) to administer the
property of the Church. The court needed to determine whether either, or both,
of those defendants were capable of being party to the particular proceedings,
which related to torts and fiduciary duty. The parties, and judges, acknowledged
that the Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney was an unincorporated association and as
such could not be sued. The difficulty the plaintiff had in determining the correct
defendants was that ‘the Catholic Church’ had no clear legal identity and the
‘membership’ of the Church changed constantly. Unchallenged canon law expert
evidence at the trial explained the division of each diocese into distinct parishes.61
Mason P, referring to these parishes stated that ‘[t]he body fluctuates as members
depart through death or other reasons and are added through birth (or baptism),
59Ellis v Pell [2006] NSWSC 109.
60Which may have been relevant to whether he was the appropriate ‘officer’ in the Church to
join in the action.
61Code of Canon Law 1917 canon 216 §1 and §3; as the allegations of abuse related to a period
prior to the 1983 amendments to the Code the 1917 Code is cited. The corresponding canon in
the Code of Canon Law 1983 is canon 374 §1. The expert was Dr Rodger Austin.
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arrival within the ecclesiastical jurisdiction or other reasons’.62 He acknowledged
that Cardinal Pell was not a member of the unincorporated association at the
time of the alleged offences and that it was difficult to identify ‘how membership
of that body was to be determined’.63 The court recognised that the membership
was difficult to establish but that this uncertainty did not preclude the church being
an unincorporated association. None of the parties joined were capable of being
liable in tort or fiduciary duty. The plaintiff in Ellis joined the Sydney Trustees to
the litigation and alleged liability on the basis that the Sydney Trustees had the
care, control and management of the parish and therefore of the priest. Where the
unincorporated association holds property on trust on behalf of its members, the
trustees may be sued in relation to actions relating to the property;64 identification
of the legal entity holding the property (the trustees) is clear. However, the Sydney
Trustees was created pursuant to the Roman Catholic Church Property Act 1936
(NSW), which strictly limited its scope to property matters (fulfilling the same role
as the corporations sole of the diocesan bishops in WA). The court accepted that
the diocese was an unincorporated association and the Sydney Trustees was a legal
entity that could sue and be sued. The court, however, rejected the notion that
Sydney Trustees was liable for all the business of the unincorporated association or
that it could be sued for issues beyond its own scope and powers, which were limited
to property. The unincorporated association had no legal status and the Sydney
Trustees could not be liable in tort, or owe a fiduciary duty for the acts of the
priest.65 The scope and powers of the corporations sole of the Western Australian
dioceses are similarly limited to property issues as confirmed in Archbishop of
62Trustees for the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis [2007] NSWCA
117, 575-576 (Mason P).
63Ibid.
64Wise v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1903] AC 139.
65Sydney Trustees were the correct party in another case relating to a lease as the dispute
related to property rights: Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney
[2005] NSWSC 381.
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Perth.66 Comparable issues of identifying parties for the purposes of legal action
also arose in Carlton Cricket & Football Social Club v Joseph67 (‘Carlton Cricket
& Football’). A lease, to which the plaintiff club was a party, covered a period
of 21 years. Membership of the club, including the committee members, was
difficult to determine for the purposes of legal action due to the length of time and
the changing memberships within the 21-year period. In both Ellis and Carlton
Cricket & Football the courts concluded that difficulty in determining membership
did not preclude the organisations from being unincorporated associations, but
acknowledged that the changing membership made it very difficult to attribute
liability to individuals.
(i) Statutory ‘loopholes’?
Some Australian courts have considered the lack of legal status of the unincorpor-
ated association as merely a ‘detail’ in court proceedings, particularly where there
was statutory support for doing so. Bailey v Victorian Soccer Federation [1976]
VR 13 considered a workers’ compensation claim by the widow and son of an ‘em-
ployee’ of a Soccer Federation that was an unincorporated association. Gillard J
said:
It is my opinion that in order to overcome the difficulties ... raised by
the common law, the extensive definition of “employer” was adopted in the
Workers Compensation Act for the purposes of arbitration proceedings ...
It was the legislative intention that by the use of the enlarged definition,
any person employed by an unincorporated body, like a club, or an associ-
ation, or a society under its collective name, could make a claim for workers
compensation from such unincorporated body in its collective name, even
though the constituent membership of the “employer” might alter from
period to period: at 22.
Gillard J specifically accepted the common law doctrine that an unincorporated
66Archbishop of Perth v AA (1995) 18 ACSR 333.
67Carlton Cricket & Football Social Club v Joseph [1970] VR 489.
18
WHERE TO FROM HERE?
body cannot be sued but applied the overriding statutory provision contained in
the Workers Compensation Act 1958 (Vic) under which the action was brought.
WA has a similar definition of worker in s 5 of the Workers’ Compensation and
Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) where a ‘worker’
... means any person who has entered into or works under a contract of
service or apprenticeship with an employer, whether by way of manual la-
bour, clerical work, or otherwise and whether the contract is expressed or
implied, is oral or in writing ...
The same definitional section specifies that an employer ‘includes any body of
persons, corporate or unincorporate’. Owing to the similarity in legislation, it is
highly likely that a WA court would follow the same reasoning as Gillard J in
Victoria in relation to workers’ compensation matters and any other legal action
where a statute has provided such a wide and encompassing definition. Mr Ellis
had no relevant legislation in NSW upon which he could rely to join a relevant
party.
In Re Independent Schools’ Staff Association (ACT) Ex parte Hubert and Others
(1986) 65 ALR 673, Gibbs CJ, Mason and Dawson JJ held that unincorporated
bodies (other than clubs) may not be employers for the purposes of the Concili-
ation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth). The distinction was made between the
board as an unincorporated association not being capable of being an employer,
and the ‘members of the Board for the time being’ who were capable of being an
employer.68 Therefore, a diocese as an unincorporated association cannot be an
employer in diocesan schools; in WA the diocesan bishop is the employer, but in
his personal capacity.69 As the diocesan bishop usually holds little or no personal
68Re Independent Schools’Staff Association (ACT) Ex parte Hubert and Others (1986) 65
ALR 673, 675.
69His other legal capacity is as a corporation sole but as seen above a corporation sole only
relates to issues concerning property, not employment. In some Eastern States the parish priest
is the employer for diocesan schools. Recommendation 16.1 of the Final Report states ‘The
bishop of each Catholic Church diocese in Australia should ensure that parish priests are not the
employers of principals and teachers in Catholic schools.’
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property, a judgment against him as a defendant is impractical. Cases departing
from the common law rule that an unincorporated association cannot sue or be
sued have been rare and usually involve trade unions or political parties, not reli-
gious institutions. In limited circumstances, however, a representative action may
overcome the limitation of not being able to sue or be sued as an unincorporated
association.
(ii) The Representative Action
Where all members of the unincorporated association have the same legal interest
in the cause of action, a representative action may apply whereby one or more
persons represent the group, pursuant to Order 18 Rule 12 of the Rules of the Su-
preme Court of Western Australia.70 This would require plaintiffs suing together.
Any judgment made in a representative action is made against all members of
the association and therefore enforceable against them.71 The requirement that all
members have the same interest in the issue makes it unlikely that a representative
action is useful for a matter in contract or tort;72 in cases relating to unincorpor-
ated associations it has only been used in relation to trade unions. In Ellis, Mason
P could find no causal connection between the Cardinal and the members of the
Church that was sufficient to render them all liable for the alleged actions of the
priest. He said that ‘[a] plaintiff cannot, by means of a procedural mechanism,
such as a representative proceeding, sue defendants against whom he or she has no
cause of action’.73 It is arguable that a court would draw the same conclusion in
relation to a representative action in which the members of a diocese were liable
70There are similar provisions in other States and Territories.
71Supreme Court Rules 1971 (WA) Order 18 Rule 12(3).
72Trustees for the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis [2007] NSWCA
117, 580 (Mason P); Carlton Cricket & Football Social Club v Joseph [1970] VR 489.
73Trustees for the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis [2007] NSWCA
117, 582 (Mason, P).
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for the actions of someone acting in a diocesan school or parish. It would only
be useful if a causal connection between the members and the legal action can
be clearly determined, which is unlikely to occur for the same reasons determined
in Ellis. Use of the representative action in cases concerning unincorporated as-
sociations is rare, and is likely to remain so in the future.74[The representative
action was rejected in][where Campbell J held, following Attorney General (Vic) v
Brighton [1964]VR 59, that parties in a representative action should have the same
interest and only the same defence: at 391, severely restricting the application of
the action. The existence of separate defences will generally defeat the common
interest requirement of the representative action. The similarities in the statutory
definitions of a representative action in these two jurisdictions and in WA make
it likely that the Western Australian courts would follow these cases, rendering
the representative action inapplicable to a plaintiff wishing to sue a diocese or a
diocesan bishop.]Serbi1970
3 Consequences for the plaintiff with a legal grievance against the Church
The plaintiff in Ellis did not submit that all members of the Catholic Church at
the relevant time were personally liable to him for the alleged acts of the priest,
but that was the legal effect of the Church being an unincorporated association.
The court ultimately held that the unincorporated association could not be sued,
but that
persons or groups within an unincorporated association can be held in tort
or contract as principals provided they assumed an active or managerial
role in which they exercised palpable control over an activity at the relevant
time. However, the liability of such persons is personal, not representative
74The representative action was successfully used in a racial discrimination case in the Federal
Court in Executive Council of Australian Jewry and Another v Scully and Another (1998) 160
ALR 137, but was interpreted there in relation to a particular section of the Racial Discrimination
Act 1975 (Cth).
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in nature.75
An action can be brought personally against members of an unincorporated asso-
ciation if they are in ‘an active or managerial role’, which means they are ‘exer-
cising palpable control over an activity’; it is not limited to committee members
of the unincorporated association. It is therefore arguable that any members of
the unincorporated association that is the Catholic Church who are in an active or
managerial role and so exercising palpable control over an activity in the church,
including a diocesan school or parish, may be held personally liable for tortious
or contractual liability.76 However, as previously noted, suing the diocesan bishop
as the person ‘exercising palpable control’ in the diocese is unlikely to be useful
in receiving an award of damages as it is improbable that a diocesan bishop will
have the personal funds required to fill any award for damages.
Where a third party takes an action in tort against a member or members of an
unincorporated association, that member or members, if liable, will be personally
liable.77 Ellis makes it unlikely that members of the Catholic Church, or even a
diocese, are liable for tortious liability of an individual within the Church where
there is no causal connection between the person and the tortious deed.78 Because
an unincorporated association is not a legal entity it cannot own, buy, sell or lease
property, real or personal, in its own name.79 The unincorporated dioceses hold
property in a separate legal entity, in WA through the corporations sole. Ascer-
taining the legal responsibility of an unincorporated association remains one of
75Trustees for the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis [2007] NSWCA
117, 577 (Mason P) citing Hrybynyuk v Mazur [2004]NSWCA 374.
76The law relating to Agency and ostensible authority is also relevant to the ‘palpable control’
of the diocesan bishop but is outside the scope of this paper.
77City of Gosnells v Roberts (1994) 12 WAR 437.
78See also, Uttinger v The Trustees of the Hospitaller Order of St John of God Brothers [2008]
NSWSC 1354; PAO v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney and
Ors [2011] NSWSC 1216.
79Sievers, above n 54, 18; see also Bacon v O’Dea (1989) 88 ALR 486, 493 (per curiam). Where
an individual is liable in a tortious action they are personally liable.
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its greatest problems and creates severe limitations for those seeking legal recom-
pense against, or for, an unincorporated association hence Recommendations 94
and 95. But why do the recommendations not go further and recommend that
Commonwealth and State governments that provide substantial funding to the
Church schools, only provide funding to bodies that have a corporate entity that
can be sued? Despite these short comings in the legal structure of the Church, the
legal issues for plaintiffs wanting to commence a child sexual abuse cause of action
have been greatly eased in Western Australia.
B Recent Legislative Changes in Western Australia
In response to the Redress and Civil Litigation Report (2015) the Western Aus-
tralian Government introduced, on 22 November 2017, the Civil Liability Legisla-
tion Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse Actions) Bill 2017 (WA) (the Bill) which
sought, inter alia, to address the Recommendations relating to the difficulties of
identifying a defendant in order to commence proceedings by amending the Civil
Liability Act 2002 (WA) (‘CLA’) and to remove any limitation period for such
actions by amending the Limitation Act 2005 (WA). Part 1 of the Bill came into
operation in April 2018 and the remainder in July 2018. Section 15B(2) of the
CLA now allows a plaintiff to commence an action against the current office holder
of an institution, in the name of the office, where at the time of the action the
institution was an unincorporated association,80 now remains unincorporated,81
the officer holder at the time of the cause of action no longer holds the office82 and
the plaintiff can maintain a cause of action against the office holder.83 To ensure
that an award of damages could be pursued after any successful action taken un-
80Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s15B(1)(c).
81Ibid s15B(1)(d).
82Ibid s15B(1)(e).
83Ibid s15B(1)(f).
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der s15B of the CLA, s15C(2) allows any liability to be satisfied by ‘assets held
by or for the office or institution, including assets of a trust (whether or not a
charitable trust)’.84 A plaintiff suing the Catholic Church pursuant to s15B(2) of
the CLA may receive an award of damages from the property held in the relevant
corporation sole. These legislative changes overcome the difficulties faced in both
the Archbishop of Perth case and Ellis.85
VI The Victorian approach
Prior to the Federal Government announcing the Royal Commission into Institu-
tional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse
[i]n April 2012, the Victorian Government initiated a landmark inquiry
into the handling of child abuse allegations within religious and other non-
government organisations. The inquiry’s final report, Betrayal of Trust was
tabled in Parliament on 13 November 2013 and contained 15 recommenda-
tions. The Victorian Government tabled its response on 8 May 2014 giving
support or in-principle support to all of the recommendations.86
The Betrayal of Trust Report,87 made the following recommendations, interalia,
relating to civil litigation:
Addressing the legal identity of non-government organisations
Rec That the Victorian Government consider requiring non-government or-
ganisations to be incorporated and adequately insured where it funds them
or provides them with tax exemptions and/or other entitlements. (Recom-
mendation 26.1, Part H)
Rec That the Victorian Government work with the Australian Government
to require religious and other non-government organisations that engage
with children to adopt incorporated legal structures. (Recommendation
26.2, Part H).87
84Ibid s15C(2).
85Archbishop of Perth v AA (1995) 18 ACSR 333; Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for
the Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565.
86Victoria State Government, Justice and Regulation, Betrayal of Trust Implementation <http:
//www. justice .vic .gov .au/home/safer+communities/protecting+children+and+families/
betrayal+of+trust+implementation>.
87Family and Community Development Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Betrayal of Trust,
Inquiry Into The Handling Of Child Abuse By Religious And Other Non-Government Organisa-
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Recommendation 95 does not recommend incorporation but only that institutions
take insurance to cover liability for child sexual abuse claims. Acknowledging
the Betrayal of Trust recommendations, the Redress and Civil Litigation Report
recognises, before making Recommendation 95, that
[i]ncorporation will not necessarily overcome the difficulties that might arise
from the passage of time or the absence of assets. However, insurance –if
the insurance policy and the insurer can be found and the insurer is solvent
–may help to overcome an absence of assets.
We are not satisfied that it is appropriate to recommend that any par-
ticular institutions should be incorporated and insured. In particular, if
incorporation and insurance for small, temporary, informal unincorporated
associations is required, people may be deterred from forming those associ-
ations and the various sporting, cultural and other activities they provide
in the community would potentially be lost.88
The Redress and Civil Litigation Report considered the ‘big picture’ – the effect
of their recommendations on the smaller institutions that may receive some fund-
ing, albeit only a small amount, from the State or Federal governments. It did not
want to discourage the establishment or continuation of smaller clubs for whom in-
corporation and insurance may have proved financially intolerable. That scenario,
however, does not relate to the Church and the Royal Commission acknowledged
that, when quoting from a submission by the Australian Lawyers Alliance:
Given that the status of the Roman Catholic Church was created at its own
request by acts of the state and territory legislatures, it should be recom-
mended that the various acts be amended to make the trustees liable along
the lines of the legislation currently before the NSW Legislative Council in
The Roman Catholic Church Property Amendment (Justice for Victims)
Bill 2012. Other churches and institutions do not generally appear to raise
the same difficulties involved in the peculiar structure of the Roman Cath-
olic Church and it is to that Church that specific amendments of state and
territory legislation is required. Should any other significant institution lack
an identifiable body to be sued, then the state or territory should similarly
legislate protection. ... However the principal need for amendment is in
respect of the Roman Catholic Church in all states and territories and the
amendment is relatively simple, as has been indicated in the NSW Legis-
tions (2013) xlv.
88McClellan AM, above n 1, 510-11.
25
(2018) 20 UNDALR
lative Council discussion on the amendment bill.89
The Roman Catholic Church Property Amendment (Justice for Victims) Bill 2012
(the Bill) lapsed in March 2014 but its relevance to WA was extremely limited.
WA did not adopt a property trust as in other States and the Bill aligned with
Recommendation 94 in allowing relevant plaintiffs to sue the property trust as the
only legal Catholic structure capable of being sued in NSW.
To effect some of the Victorian recommendations:
On 1 July 2017, the Wrongs Amendment (Organisational Child Abuse) Act
2017 will come into effect. The Act will create a new duty of care that will
allow an organisation to be held liable in negligence for organisational child
abuse, unless the organisation proves that it took reasonable precautions to
prevent the abuse... The Limitation of Actions Amendment (Child Abuse)
Act 2015 passed the Victorian Parliament in 2015, and became operative
on 1 July 2015. The Act completely removed the limitation periods that
apply to civil actions founded upon child abuse, with both retrospective and
prospective effect. The reforms also removed the 12-year long-stop limita-
tion period for wrongful death actions in relation to child abuse brought by
dependants of a deceased victim.90
These implementations, although they should be commended, fall short of im-
plementing Betrayal of Trust Recommendation 26.2. The Victorian Government
acknowledges that it is still working to effect this recommendation, including ‘the
incorporation and insurance arrangements of certain organisations’.91 WA is also
working towards reform, most notably the changes to the CLA and the Limita-
tion Act which have removed any limitation period for actions arising from child
sexual abuse, and provided a defendant that can be sued on behalf of the Church
in actions arising from child sexual abuse.92
89Ibid 511 referring to Australian Lawyers Alliance, Submission to the Royal Commission
into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Consultation Paper into Redress and Civil
Litigation, 2015, 25-26.
90Victoria State Government, above n 86.
91Ibid.
92Limitation Act 2005 (WA) s 1.
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VII The model litigant
Compliance with recommendations 94 and 95, and the legislative changes in WA,
provide plaintiffs with an opportunity to commence legal proceedings. Those pro-
ceedings must not be used to cause further trauma or disadvantage to plaintiffs.
‘Australian courts have long recognised that governments are expected to act as
model litigants.’93 This does not extend to non-government agencies and was not
always evident in cases involving abuse victims. Recommendations 96 – 99 address
the need for all parties, but particularly those defending claims, to act as model
litigants:
96. Government and non-government institutions that receive, or expect
to receive, civil claims for institutional child sexual abuse should adopt
guidelines for responding to claims for compensation concerning allegations
of child sexual abuse.
97. The guidelines should be designed to minimise potential re-traumatisation
of claimants and to avoid unnecessarily adversarial responses to claims.
98. The guidelines should include an obligation on the institution to provide
assistance to claimants and their legal representatives in identifying the
proper defendant to a claim if the proper defendant is not identified or is
incorrectly identified.
99. Government and non-government institutions should publish the guidelines
they adopt or otherwise make them available to claimants and their legal
representatives.
The Legal Services Directions 2017 require the Commonwealth and all Common-
wealth agencies to act as model litigants. ‘In essence, being a model litigant
requires that the Commonwealth and Commonwealth agencies, as parties to litig-
ation, act with complete propriety, fairly and in accordance with the highest pro-
fessional standards’94 but does not preclude them from acting firmly and properly
93McClellan AM, above n 1, 512; Melbourne Steamship Limited v Moorhead (1912) 15 CLR
133, at 342; Kenny v State of South Australia (1987) 46 SASR 268, at 273; Yong v The Minister
for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 75 FCR 155.
94Legal Services Directions 2017, Appendix B, Note 2. The Legal Services directions are made
under section 55ZF of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
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to protect their interests95 or seek costs orders where appropriate.96 The principal
obligation rests with the Commonwealth or the Commonwealth agency but all
lawyers engaged in the litigation, including in-house and private lawyers, must
also uphold the requirement.97
Victoria,98 NSW,99 Queensland100 and the Australian Capital Territory101 have
model litigation guidelines for their government agencies. It is the writer’s conten-
tion that State and Territory governments ought to formally adopt Model Litigant
Guidelines for all litigation to ensure that the spirit of Recommendations 94 and
95 are executed in all claims against the Church.
VIII Conclusion
The Royal Commission’s Recommendations 94 and 95 arise from the need for a
plaintiff to be able to easily, and justly, identify a proper defendant for a claim
arising from child sexual abuse. Current common law structures in the Church,
discussed above, made it extremely difficult to sue the Church, and associated
people, in any legal matters other than causes of action relating to the property
95Ibid Note 4.
96Ibid Note 5.
97Ibid Note 6.
98Victoria State Government, above n 86; the Common Guiding Principles complement the
Model Litigant Guidelines and are specifically directed to litigation involving child abuse:
Victoria State Government, Common Guiding Principles, Chapter 1, and also incorporates
Guidelines for claims involving child sexual abuse <http ://www. justice .vic .gov .au/home/
justice+system/laws+and+regulation/common+guiding+principles+-+child+sexual+abuse+
civil+claims>.
99NSW Government, Guiding Principles for Government Agencies Responding to Civil Claims
for Child Abuse <https : / /arp . nsw . gov . au/ sites /default / files /NS%5C%20Government%
5C%20Guiding%5C%20Principles%5C%20for%5C%20Government%5C%20Agencies%5C%
20Responding%5C%20to%5C%20Civil% 5C%20Claims%5C%20for%5C%20Child%5C%
20Abuse.pdf>.
100Department of Justice and Attorney General (Qld), Model Litigant Principles (2010) <www.
justice.qld.gov.au>.
101Law Officer (Model Litigant) Guidelines 2010 (No 1) (March 2010) www.legislation.act.gov.
au pursuant to Law Officers Act 2011, s 11.
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of the Church. Recommendations 94 and 95 of the Redress and Civil Litigation
Report, if adopted by the relevant state and territory governments, provide surviv-
ors with justice. The WA government has introduced legislation that provides the
same outcome as that intended by Recommendations 94 and 95 – that plaintiffs
have an entity to sue and access to assets for any damages award. Whilst it is
likely that most survivors will seek recompense from the Commonwealth Redress
Scheme should the Church agree to join it,102 they should be able to sue the Church
if that is how they choose to seek justice.
The legislative changes in WA now allow an action against the Catholic Church but
these changes are limited to a child sexual abuse cause of action.103 Recommend-
ations 94 and 95 relate only to those plaintiffs seeking ‘to commence proceedings
for damages in respect of institutional child sexual abuse where the institution is
alleged to be an institution with which a property trust is associated’.104 What of
any other plaintiffs that have a legal grievance against the Church that does not
involve property? They still face the challenges of pursuing legal action that the
Redress and Civil Litigation Report identify, criticise and seek to rectify. Like-
wise, all litigants – not just those seeking damages in respect of institutional child
sexual abuse – should have the ability to sue the Church where it is just to do so
102The Scheme will commence on 1 July 2018 Australian Government, Commonwealth redress
scheme for survivors of institutional child sexual abuse <https://www.dss.gov.au/families-
and- children/programs- services/children/commonwealth - redress - scheme- for - survivors - of -
institutional-child-sexual-abuse>; ‘The Catholic Church yesterday began historic negotiations
to join the Turnbull government’s $4 billion sex abuse redress scheme, a move that would place
intense pressure on the remaining states and faiths yet to sign up. Social Services Minister Dan
Tehan said Catholic Church officials had agreed to hold intensive talks in the next three weeks to
iron out problems with the draft laws to enable the faith to lead the way among non-government
institutions. If the church opts in before the July 1 start – as expected – it will transform the
rollout of the scheme in Australia. Mr Tehan met Catholic officials in Canberra where the path
was laid for the church to opt into the scheme, which would provide up to $150,000 in redress
to proven victims but with a lower burden of proof compared with the courts’ John Ferguson,
‘Catholic Deal Looms For Redress Payments to Sex Abuse Victims’, The Australian (Sydney),
15 March 2018.
103Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 15B(1).
104McClellan AM, above n 1, recommentation 94.
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and not be stifled by legal technicalities.
Incorporation for the Church would not be detrimental in any sense other than its
property will no longer be ‘protected’ by being inaccessible to litigants other than
those with a cause of action in either property or child sexual abuse. Recommend-
ation 94 seeks to alleviate the issue of finding an appropriate legal entity to sue
by allowing the Plaintiff to sue the legal body that holds the Church’s property,
which requires new legislation in the States and Territories to allow it to happen.
The Truth, Justice and Healing Council accepted the need for the adoption of a
corporate body when replying to the Consultation Paper 5, Civil Liability:
The identity and corporate structure of the body corporate should be left to
the institutions to determine in accordance with their internal structures,
provided that the body corporate has sufficient assets or is appropriately
insured or indemnified. The legislation should apply equally to all insti-
tutions and not interfere with the right of religious institutions to arrange
their affairs according to their norms or beliefs but instead should simply
provide that there be an identifiable body corporate that is appropriately
insured or indemnified. ...105
The Religious Institutions were, and remain, corporate bodies. These bodies vary
between institutions including incorporated associations,106 companies limited by
guarantee107 and statutory corporations108 to name the most common. The Church
too, needs to adopt a corporate structure, preferably for each diocese so the com-
mon law identity has some parallel to the juridical identity.109
105Ibid 504 - 505.
106Eg, under the Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA).
107Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s112.
108Eg, Roman Catholic Church Trust Property Act 1936 (NSW); or the Roman Catholic Trusts
Act 1907 (Vic).
109Which corporate structure is appropriate, and why, is outside the scope of this paper.
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